In chapter 4, I examined the industrial organization and institutional basis of government-business relations in Taiwan and economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait. But any study of economic interactions across the Strait remains incomplete without an explication of state-business relations on the mainland. The fact that so many Taiwanese businesspeople have been attracted to the mainland suggests that an inquiry is needed into the interactions between Taiwanese businesses and local governments on the mainland, and between small Taiwanese investors and local firms. This chapter analyzes the dynamics involved in the political economy of China's contemporary transformation, and the nascent growth of state-business relations at the local level, especially between local governments and small investors from Taiwan. This analysis is reinforced with a case study of Taiwanese investment in Jiangsu, the Chinese province with the largest concentration of Taiwanese investment. Theoretically, it invokes the concept of the state as a disaggregated complex to provide a corrective to the traditional conceptualization of the state as a unitary entity.
Culture plays a major role in many of the existing analyses of Taiwanese investment in mainland China.
1 However, this chapter focuses on the organizational characteristics of Taiwanese businesses and local mainland firms and the institutional environment in which these firms interact with local governments. Cultural affinity, in this context, is understood as a means of lowering transaction costs and facilitating exchange. This is especially important given the rent-seeking environment that has emerged as a consequence of some peculiar features of the economic reform policies of mainland China.
"Particularistic Contracting" and Rents
The core of China's economic reforms since the late 1970s has been the "fiscal contractual responsibility system." In 1980, this system took the form of "sharing revenues and assigning responsibilities according to levels of administration," in which central and local governments divided revenues according to the revenue sources and ownership of enterprises. The key to this reform lay in profit retention and sharing arrangements. Like economic enterprises, local governments have been allowed to retain surplus revenue after paying a negotiated share of local taxes to the central government (mostly taxes on state and collective enterprises that constitute the core of the "within-budget revenues," yusuannei zijin). By the mid1980s, all subnational levels of government were subject to a bottom-up revenue-sharing system that required localities to submit a certain portion of their revenues to the upper levels of government while retaining all, or at least most, of the remainder. Through this scheme, the central government endowed local governments with greater fiscal autonomy as well as financial responsibility. In a similar fashion, various profit-sharing arrangements were also made between local governments and firms, usually at a set rate and for a fixed period of time ranging from three to five years.
2
Since not all revenues collected by a locality are subject to upward revenue sharing, the better the financial performance of enterprises and the faster the economic growth of the area, the greater the annual increase in revenues available to the local government. Thus, the fiscal contracting system has provided an economic foundation for rapid, local-government-led growth-especially at the county, township, and village levels-by giving officials both the incentive and the investment funds needed to become effective promoters of local industrialization.
In addition to budgetary incentives, even stronger motivation is provided by extrabudgetary revenues (yusuanwai zijin), which are not shared with higher levels of government. Between 1987 and 1991, provincial extrabudgetary funds increased by almost 60%-from 202.88 billion yuan to 324.33 billion yuan. Equal to only 20% of the national budget in the early 1980s, extrabudgetary funds grew to match the national budget by the end of the decade.
3 Before the 1980s, this revenue was primarily composed of depreciation funds-a fixed residual that remained with the locality and provided a pool of funds that could be
